Law in Transition and Development: The Case of Russia by Marin, Dalia
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2004 
 
 
*Dalia Marin, University of Munich and CEPR  
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
Discussion Paper No. 78 
Law in Transition and 
Development: The Case of Russia 
Dalia Marin* 
Law in Transition and Development:
The Case of Russia∗
Dalia Marin, University of Munich and CEPR
April 2004
Abstract
The rise of barter and non-cash payments has become a dominant feature of the
Russian transition to a market economy. This paper confronts with empirical evi-
dence two approaches to explain barter in Russia: the ’illusion view’ and the ’trust
view’ of barter. The ’illusion view’ suggests that barter allows the parties to pre-
tend that the manufacturing sector in Russia is producing value added by enabling
this sector to sell its output at a higher price than its market value. The ’trust
view’ sees barter as an institution to deal with the absence of trust and liquidity
in the Russian economy. We confront the prediction of both explanations with
actual data on barter in Ukraine in 1997. The data reject the ’illusion view‘ in
favor of the ‘trust view‘ of barter.
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1. Introduction
Demonetization has become one of the dominant features of the Russian transition
to a market economy. Different estimates suggest that the share of non-cash
payments made 60 percent of sales in 1998 in Russia and 50 percent of sales in
Ukraine in 1997.1 The survey of 200 firms by the Russian Economic Barometer
since 1992, in turn, suggests that non-cash payments rose steadily from 8 percent
in 1992 to 54 percent in mid-1998. Since the financial crisis in August of 1998
barter and other money surrogates have started to decline accounting for less
than 10 percent of receipts of industrial firms in February 2003. A similar picture
emerges from a Goskomstat survey among 2000 large firms which reveals a share
of non-cash payments of around 70 percent in early 1998 and a subsequent decline
to 60 percent in 1999.
Figure 1. Barter Share of Total transactions in Russia 1992 - 2003
Source: Russian Economic Barometer
1See Commander and Mummsen 1998 for Russia , Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij 2000 for
Ukraine.
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This time pattern of the process of demonetization is particularly puzzling.
Barter started to rise after macroeconomic stabilization and has started to de-
cline when macroeconomic instability set in after the August financial crisis. How
can this time pattern of demonetization in the Russian economy be explained?
In this paper I look at the empirical validity of one of the most influential
explanations of demonetization in Russia - the virtual economy argument.2The
argument claims that by allowing to change the prices of the goods exchanged
in a hidden way barter helps different groups in the economy to keep the illusion
that the manufacturing sector is producing valuable output while in fact it is not.
Based on a unique deal-specific data set of 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997
we have information on the price differential between the cash and barter prices
for the individual goods exchanged in barter deals. Thus, we can put the virtual
economy argument to an empirical test. We find that illusion is not what is driv-
ing the actual pricing behavior in barter deals. We then proceed to offer a stylized
model of how the observed pricing behavior in barter deals can be explained. The
model sees the non-cash economy as an institutional response to the lack of trust
and liquidity in the Russian economy. We test the price predictions of the model
with actual price data and find that the data do not reject the trust view of the
non-cash economy.
Why does it matter whether the ”illusion-view” or the ”trust-view” is better
able to describe the actual development in Russia? The two views differ with
respect to their policy implications of how to remonetize the Russian economy. If
the ”illusion-view” is correct, the main source of the problem lies in the real sector
of the economy and barter is a ”bad” thing because it allows the manufacturing
sector to avoid restructuring and thus to avoid to get rid of the distortions in the
real sector. If the ”trust-view” is the correct description, then the main source
of the problem lies in the financial sector of the economy and barter is a ”good”
thing because it allows the real sector to finance production when the banking sec-
tor does not fulfill its role of intermediation to channel private savings to finance
investment in the real sector. According to both views barter helps to maintain
production. The ”illusion view” sees barter to help maintain an inefficient output
2See Gaddy and Ickes 1998, for the empirical validity of other explanations, see Marin,
Kaufmann, and Gorochowskij 2000.
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by pretending that it is valuable. The ”trust view” sees barter to help maintain
a valuable output by overcoming a financial and input shortage which otherwise
would lead to the collapse of output.
In a final section the paper concludes by discussing how a model based on trust
can explain the evolution of barter over time in Russia and by discussing what
has contributed to the vanishing barter economy after the August 1998 financial
crisis in Russia.
By looking at how a model based on trust can explain the shift in the terms of
trade of the non-cash economy in the former Soviet Union, this paper complements
previous work on the subject. In Marin and Schnitzer (2003) we focus on the ouput
decline in transition economies and we show how a model based on trust and
liquidity can explain why the economic performance of the former Soviet Union
was much worse than that of Central Europe. In Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij
(2000) we expose to the data several of the explanations of barter in transition
economies which have been given in the literature like soft-budget constraints,
market distortions, tax avoidance, and the lack of credit. Finally, in Huang,
Marin, Xu (2003) we examine possible long-term costs of barter by focusing on
the banking failure. We explore how barter may have contributed to a banking
development trap which hinders the sector to fulfil its role as a financial institution
in Russia.
2. Some Stylized Facts
We conducted a survey among 55 enterprises in Ukraine in 1997 from three cities
Kyiv (50 percent), Zaporioshje (30 percent), and Dnipropetrovsk (20 percent).
From this survey we obtained deal-specific information on 165 barter deals. Each
barter deal includes information on the selling firm and the buying firm and the
type of goods exchanged. We distinguish the ”sale” side of the barter deal and
the ”goods payment”. The interviewed firms were selected from an address list of
firms of the local office of the Harvard Institute of Internationale Development in
Kyiv. These firms were contacted by phone in order to secure their cooperation.
The 55 firms of our sample were finally those who agreed to participate in the
survey. The unit of analysis of the survey was one particular barter deal. Each firm
provided us with information on 3 deals. The questionnaire asked for information
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on about forty dimensions on the ”sale” and the ”goods payment” side of the
barter transaction. The ”sale” was defined by the transaction of the seller who
initiated the deal. The ”goods payment” was the buyer’s payment for the ”sale”.
Because of the length of the questionnaire we personally visited these firms to fill
in the questionnaire. Many of the firms were well informed about the firms they
traded with because these firms served as financiers. This is how we obtained firm
level information for about 100 firms (depending on the respective information)
by interviewing 55 firms. The average share of barter in percent of firms’ sales
is 45 percent with a minimum barter share of 1 percent and a maximum share
of 100 percent. The barter deals are typically large in size ranging between US$
10 and US$ 5,000,000 with a mean size of US$ 135,679. Firms’ arrears make on
average 30 percent of firms’ sales with a maximum of 626 percent. On average,
firms financed 6.31 percent of output by bank debt with a maximum of over 100
percent.
Table 1 identifies the type of firms involved in barter deals. The table illus-
trates that the non- cash economy is not an exclusive phenomenon of state owned
enterprises. In 29.7 percent of the deals the selling firm is a state enterprise and in
20.6 percent a private firm. 4.2 percent of the sample consist of barter deals with
workers. On the buying end of the barter transaction the picture looks similar.
In 29.5 percent of the deals the buying firm is a state owned enterprise and in
25.2 percent of the deals a private firm.3
3The firms in the address list were selected to secure representativity of the data material.
Attention has been paid in particular to having a good representation of sectors, firm sizes, and
ownership structure of firms compared to the Ukrainian economy. An ex-post comparison of the
data sample with available aggregate data indicates that the data are indeed fairly representative.
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Table 1                                           Ownership and the Non-Cash Economy
selling firm buying firm
in percent in percent
domestic state or state controlled enterprise 29,70 29,45
domestic private firm 20,61 25,15
foreign firm 0,0 2,45
leaseholder/ cooperative 1,82 4,29
worker 4,24 0,0
the government 0,0 4,29
collective owned enterprise 33,94 29,45
GUS firm 4,24 4,29
joint-venture 5,45 0,61
total 100,00 100,00
Source: Survey of 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997
Table 2 looks at the sectoral pattern of these 165 barter deals. Two things
appear from the table. First, there is not much difference in the sectoral pattern
between the ”sale” side of the barter transaction and the ”goods payment” side.
Second, barter dominates in food and beverages, in the basic sector, and in ma-
chinery and vehicles.
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Table 2                 
“sale” “goods payment”
in percent in percent
natural resources 28,48 30,30
textile & leather 7,88 5,45
wood & paper 2,42 4,24
machinery & vehicles 16,97 23,03
food & beverages 16,36 22,42
chemicals 13,33 9,09
services 14,55 0,61
others 0,0 4,85
total 100,00 100,00
Source: Survey of 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997
Sectoral Pattern                                                           
Table 3 gives the terms of trade effect of the non-cash economy. From our
survey data we have information on the percentage price difference between the
barter price and the cash price for each of the 165 barter deals of the sample. We
have this information for both sides - the ”sale” and the ”goods payment” of each
deal so that we can calculate the net terms of trade effect of barter. SCASH is
the percentage price difference between the barter price and the cash price on the
”sale” side of the barter deal. PCASH is the percentage difference between the
barter price and the cash price on the ”goods payment” of the barter deal. TOT
measures the net terms of trade of barter and is calculated by TOT = SCASH -
PCASH.4 It appears from the table that on the ”sale” side of the deal the prices
charged in barter are inflated by up to 50 % compared to cash deals. This hap-
pened in 23.3% of the cases while in 73.6 % of the deals there was no difference
between the two prices charged. In 3.1% of the cases the firms involved discounted
4We obtained this information from the following question. ”What is the percentage price
difference between the price you charge/you are charged for this particular good in this barter
deal as compared to the typical price you charge/you are charged for the same product in cash
deals? ”
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the price on the ”sale” by up to 17%. In order to calculate who benefits from
demonetization one has to look also at the pricing behavior on the ”goods pay-
ment” side of the deal. Here it appears that in 25.9 percent of the cases the firms
discounted the price for the barter good compared to what they typically charge
in cash deals by as much as 50% . In 62.9% of the deals there was no discounting
or inflating on the barter prices for the goods payment. In 11.1% of the deals the
barter prices were inflated by as much as 200%. Because of these differences in
the pricing behavior between barter and cash deals, the net terms of trade effect
of barter appears to be quite substantial ranging between -200% and 50%. As a
result the non-cash economy appears to lead to a substantial shift in the terms
of trade compared to the cash-economy. In almost 45 percent of the deals barter
shifts the terms of trade towards the ”sale” side of the transaction. In those cases
the ”real” barter price of the ”sale” is inflated by up to 50% compared to the cash
price for the same goods.
What explains this shift in the terms of trade of the non-cash economy? Why
does barter lead to an increase of the real price for the ”sale”? Who benefits
from this shift and who loses? In the next two sections we look at two possible
explanations for this shift in the terms of trade.
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Table 3   
3,07       25,93     
73,62     62,96     
23,31     11,11     
100,00   100,00   
10,49     
45,06     
44,44     
100,00   
Source: Survey of 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997
1) in percent of cash price
 Terms of Trade                   
total
0% - 50%
0%
terms of trade 
"sale" "goods payment"
total
-200% - 0%
-50% - 0%
0%
0% - 200%
differential between barter and cash price1)
total
-17% - 0%
0%
0% - 50%
3. ”Illusion” and the Non-Cash Economy
The virtual economy argument of Gaddy and Ickes (1998) rests on the assumption
that the manufacturing sector does not produce valuable output and important
groups in the economy (like the government and firms in different sectors) have
an interest to pretend that this is not the case. According to this argument barter
- a payment in goods or money surrogates rather than cash - is a way for these
participants to keep the illusion of a value-creating manufacturing sector by al-
lowing the latter sector to sell its output at a higher price than its market value
and the value-adding natural resource sector to accept this overpricing out of lack
of other opportunities. This way the manufacturing sector survives by drawing
resources from the natural resource sector. According to the argument, keeping
up the illusion of a value-adding manufacturing sector is highly costly for the
Russian economy at large because this cross-subsidizing from the value-adding
natural resource sector to the value-subtracting manufacturing sector prevents
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the manufacturing sector from moving into valuable activity. But if the natural
resource sector is producing valuable output, why has the sector nothing better to
do than to subsidize the manufacturing sector? In fact, the natural resource sec-
tor is supposed to have significant bargaining power in the interaction with other
sectors when it is producing goods which the market values highly. Why then
does the sector end up subsidizing the rest of the economy? The argument does
not make much economic sense. However, the argument appeals to experts of cen-
tral planning and policy observers in transition economies, because the practice of
cross-subsidizing across different activities in the economy was a widespread fea-
ture of central planning. Therefore, let us pretend for a moment that the virtual
economy argument does make economic sense and let us see whether it is actually
true.
We can answer this question from our survey data, since we have information
on the percentage price difference between the barter and cash prices for each of
the 165 barter deals in the sample. We have this information for both sides (the
”sale” and the ”goods payment”) of each barter deal so that we can calculate
to whose favor the terms of trade shifts in non-cash transactions. As Table 3
illustrates the terms of trade shifts quite substantially in non-cash transactions.
Thus, the virtual economy argument has the potential of explaining some of the
variation in the terms of trade of barter.5
If the virtual economy argument is valid, we expect that the manufacturing
sector (like textiles, leather, machinery, and vehicles) is overpricing its output in
barter compared to cash deals for the same product and pays less than the market
value for natural resources (like gas and electricity). Furthermore, we expect this
pricing distortion to be more pronounced for less efficient sectors.
In order to test these hypotheses we have to distinguish whether the sector
is on the buying or selling end of the barter transaction. The reason is that
overpricing the ”sale” will benefit the sector which is on the selling end of the
barter transaction and hurt the sector which is on the buying end of the same
transaction. Similarly, discounting the price for the ”goods payment” will benefit
the sector which is on the buying end and hurt the sector which is on the selling
end. TOT measures the net terms of trade and is calculated by TOT = SCASH
5The data are from Ukraine and not from Russia. Both countries are, however, very similar
with respect the macroeconomic situation as well as the development of their legal and financial
institutions.
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- PCASH. Thus, when the sector is on the selling end and TOT takes a positive
value, barter benefits this sector by shifting the terms of trade in its favor. Simi-
larly, when the sector is on the buying end and TOT takes a positive value, then
barter hurts this sector by shifting the terms of trade in its disfavor.
We are now ready to put the virtual economy argument to an empirical test.
Table 4 examines whether differences in the pricing behavior across sectors can be
identified. The table aggregates the 165 barter deals into 4 sectors and looks at
their pricing behavior in non-cash deals compared to cash deals. The table distin-
guishes whether the sector is on the selling or buying end of the transaction. From
Table 4 it appears that there is no systematic difference in the pricing behavior
across sectors in non-cash transactions (the F-test of the Analysis of Variance
(Anova) is not statistically significant at conventional levels). Take the example
of the manufacturing sector which includes textiles, leather, machinery and vehi-
cles, and chemicals. When this sector is on the selling end of the transaction, it
overprices its output on average by 4.03 percent compared to cash deals and it is
discounted on the goods payment by 0.75 percent on average, so that the sector’s
net benefit from barter is 4.78 percent (in terms of its cash price).6 So far so good.
But the same appears to be true for the natural resource sector which includes
electricity and gas, coke, petroleum, metal ores and non-metallic minerals. This
sector’s net benefit from barter is 4.88 percent (in terms of its cash price). What
seems to matter here for the pricing behavior in non-cash transactions is not the
sector, but whether the sector is on the selling or buying end of the transaction.
Take again the example of the manufacturing sector. When this sector is on the
buying end of the barter deal, it pays more for the ”sale” by 4.81 percent on
average and sells its ”good payment” at a 3.52 percent discount compared to cash
deals, so that the sector’s net loss from barter is 8.33 percent on average. This net
loss from non-cash transactions appears to be happening in all the other sectors
as well, when the sector is a buyer rather than a seller. It appears then that the
sectors gain from barter when they sell and they loose from barter when they buy.
This is not what we would have expected if we believed in the virtual economy
argument of Russia’s non-cash economy.
6The average percent price differential between barter and cash appear to be low from table
4. These averages hide the actual variation in the price differentials, because in 45 percent of
the deals the non-cash and cash prices were equal. For the distribution of the price differentials
see Table 3.
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scash1) pcash2) tot3) scash pcash tot
mean 0,00 -4,12 4,12 3,78 7,42 -3,64
std. dev. 0,00 8,52 8,52 8,80 45,06 42,11
N 17 17 17 18 18 18
mean 5,48 1,45 4,03 1,13 -1,31 2,44
std. dev. 14,45 10,28 8,37 5,50 6,54 6,57
N 13 13 13 16 16 16
mean 5,00 -1,29 6,29 2,50 0,58 1,92
std. dev. 10,16 6,05 10,05 8,09 17,02 18,29
N 17 17 17 18 18 18
mean 2,64 1,00 1,64 3,03 -2,47 5,51
std. dev. 6,53 38,45 35,75 9,45 15,38 14,09
N 27 27 27 36 36 36
mean 1,86 0,26 1,61 5,21 -4,17 9,38
std. dev. 8,46 6,86 9,99 7,11 7,93 9,66
N 16 16 16 12 12 12
mean 3,66 0,91 2,75 3,46 -5,06 8,52
std. dev. 7,41 10,64 13,51 7,67 9,96 11,40
N 28 28 28 30 30 30
mean 6,08 -3,60 9,68 7,19 0,07 7,12
std. dev. 9,49 12,50 11,18 9,47 12,01 8,59
N 22 22 22 15 15 15
mean 2,83 -4,04 6,86 0,00 -10,00 10,00
std. dev. 6,54 17,72 16,27 , , ,
N 23 23 23 1 1 1
mean 3,43 -1,16 4,59 3,52 -1,21 4,73
std. dev. 8,30 18,63 18,07 8,26 19,66 18,86
N 163 163 163 146 146 146
F-test 1,08 0,33 0,52 0,76 0,77 0,93
sign. level (0,382) (0,937) (0,817) (0,619) (0,614) (0,489)
1) difference between the barter price and the cash price in percent of the cash price in the "sale" side of the barter deal. 
2) difference between the barter price and the cash price in percent of the cash price in the "goods payment" of the barter deal. 
3) tot = scash - pcash
Table 4                     Pricing Behavior of Sectors
machinery & vehicles
electricity & gas
coke & petroleum
selling sector
Anova 
buying sector
chemicals
services
total
metal ores & other non-
metallic minerals
food & beverages
textiles & leather
We now examine whether this result depends on the level of aggregation of
sectors. In Table 5 we aggregate the sectors to a natural resource sector (includ-
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ing electricity and gas, coke and petroleum, metal ores and other non-metallic
minerals) and to a manufacturing sector (including textiles, leather, machinery,
vehicles, and chemicals). We construct a variable which we call virtual economy 1
which includes all deals in which the natural resource sector was on the selling end
of the transaction and the manufacturing sector on the buying end. If the virtual
economy argument is valid then we expect to see a discount on the ”sale” price
and a mark-up over the cash price on the ”goods payment” leading to a net terms
of trade shift in favor of the manufacturing sector. A look at Table 5 reveals that
the opposite is the case. The natural resource sector lives at the expense of the
manufacturing sector who suffers a loss in the terms of trade of 6.88 percent on
average when the natural resource sector is the seller and manufacturing the buyer
in the transaction. Can the manufacturing sector draw on the resources of the
natural resource sector when he is selling to this sector rather than buying from it?
This case is captured by the variable virtual economy 2 which includes all deals
in which manufacturing is the seller and the natural resources sector the buyer in
the transaction. The table reveals that in this case both sectors are overpricing
their output in non-cash transactions compared to cash leading to a slight terms
of trade gain for the manufacturing sector of 1.13 percent. Moreover, the constel-
lation of the manufacturing sector as the seller and the natural resource sector as
the buyer in barter has been taking place in 23 deals only out of a total of 165
deals. These numbers are much too small to plausibly explain the enormous shift
towards non-cash transactions in Russia. Furthermore, the F-tests reject the hy-
pothesis that there is any difference in the pricing behavior for both constellations.
We turn now to the second prediction of the virtual economy argument. The
bottom part of Table 5 examines whether the price distortions between non-
cash and cash deals are more pronounced for less efficient firms. If the virtual
economy argument is valid we expect this to be the case, because firms with lower
productivity will need to inflate their prices by more or get bigger discounts for the
barter goods in order to pretend to produce value added. From the table it appears
that there is no statistical significant relation between the price distortions and the
efficiency of the firm. If at all, it appears to be the firms with productivity levels
in the middle range who show the largest price differentials between non-cash and
cash transactions.7
7Moreover, Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000) show that the firm’s barter exposure
does not increase for less efficient firms.
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mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. N
virtual economy 1
seller: natural resources4) 
buyer: manufacturing5)
1,47 4,24 -5,41 9,24 6,88 9,30 17
other 3,66 8,63 -0,66 19,39 4,32 18,84 146
   total 3,43 8,30 -1,16 18,63 4,59 18,07 163
   Anova F-test 1,06 0,99 0,31
   sign. level (0,306) (0,321) (0,581)
virtual economy 2
seller:  manufacturing5) 
buyer: natural resources4) 
1,43 5,85 0,30 12,91 1,13 14,20 23
other 3,76 8,61 -1,40 19,44 5,15 18,62 140
   total 3,43 8,30 -1,16 18,63 4,59 18,07 163
   Anova F-test 1,55 0,16 0,98
   sign. level (0,215) (0,686) (0,324)
firm's efficiency6)
    low 3,13 7,78 -0,13 11,21 3,27 12,26 57
    medium 2,76 7,07 -4,88 10,60 7,64 12,24 60
    high 2,91 10,11 1,16 33,96 1,75 31,29 36
   total 2,93 8,08 -1,69 19,03 4,62 18,58 153
   Anova F-test 0,03 1,45 1,38
   sign. level (0,969) (0,239) (0,255)
1) difference between the barter price and the cash price in percent of cash price in the "sale" side of the barter deal, denoted scash. 
2) difference between the barter price and the cash price in percent of cash price in the "goods payment" of the barter deal, denoted pcash. 
3) terms of trade = scash - pcash
4) includes electricity & gas, coke & petroleum and metal ores & other non- metallic minerals.
5) includes textiles & leather, mashinery & vehicles, and chemicals.
6) output per employee. Low : 1,000 to 7,500 US$, medium: 7,100 to 15,000 US$, high: 15,100 to 140,000 US$.
Table 5                     Is Russia's Economy Virtual ?
% price differential on
"sale" 1) "goods payment" 2) "terms of trade" 3)
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In Table 6 we look at the distribution of the terms of trade of barter for two
leading sectors: manufacturing and electricity & gas. The first three columns
of the table give the pricing behavior of electricity & gas when the sector is on
the selling end of the transaction. It can be seen from the table that the sector
charges the same price as in cash deals when it sells electricity & gas and receives
in more than 20 percent of the deals a discount of up to 50% for the goods he is
paid with so that the terms of trade shifts in more than 20% of the deals in favor
of the electricity & gas sector. The table shows no single case in which this sector
has been subsidizing an other sector when doing a barter deal. The next three
columns of the table look at the pricing behavior of electricity & gas when this
sector is on the buying end of the transaction. In this case the sector buys in more
than 16% of the deals an overpriced good from other sectors (the price is inflated
by up to 50%) and gives a discount on electricity and gas of up to 50% when
selling it to other sectors so that the sector ends up with a terms of trade loss of
up to 50% in 33% of the deals. When this terms of trade loss of the electricity &
gas sector is compared to the terms of trade loss of the manufacturing sector as a
buyer (as can be seen in the last column of the same table) the latter sector has
to suffer a loss in 53.6% of the deals (compared to 33% of electricity & gas).
To conclude, the virtual economy argument is virtual and has no basis in the
data. Who benefits from the non-cash economy does not depend on the sector, as
the argument claims, but is exclusively driven by the selling or buying status of
firms. But why would the selling or buying status of firms determine in who’s fa-
vor the terms of trade shifts in barter? Or to put it differently, why are frequently
prices for the ”sale” inflated and prices for the ”goods payment” discounted in
barter transactions? I turn to an answer to this question in the next section.8
8The fact that the terms of trade is shifting in 45% of the deals towards the ”sale” side of
the barter deal casts further doubts on the explanation that barter is driven by tax motives.
As Table 3 shows it is only in 10.5% of the deals in which firms could potentially hide some of
their profits lowering their tax base. This number corresponds roughly to the number of cases
in which the interviewed firms gave taxes some importance for undertaking a barter deal, see
Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000).
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Table 6
scash pcash tot scash pcash tot
< 0% 0,0 23,53 0,0 0,0 22,22 5,56
0% 100,00 76,47 76,47 83,33 72,22 61,11
> 0% 0,0 0,0 23,53 16,67 5,56 33,33
missing 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
scash pcash tot scash pcash tot
< 0% 4,48 20,90 10,45 1,45 26,09 5,80
0% 62,69 68,66 40,30 66,67 63,77 39,13
> 0% 31,34 8,96 47,76 31,88 8,70 53,62
missing 1,49 1,49 1,49 0,0 1,45 1,45
total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Source: Survey of 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997
1) manufactoring: textiles & leather, wood & paper, machinery & vehicles, and chemicals
seller
manufacturing1)
buyer
manufacturing1)
Terms of Trade
in percent
seller
gas & electricity
buyer
gas & electricity
4. ”Trust” and the Non-Cash Economy
If the virtual economy argument has no empirical basis, how can we explain that
the seller is overpricing the ”sale” and the buyer is discounting the price for the
”goods payment” in non-cash transactions? If hiding a valueless output is not the
reason, what else motivates such pricing behavior? We turn now to a model for
an answer.
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4.1. A Stylized Model9
Consider a good which requires n steps of production to become a final good.
Each production step is carried out by a different firm. After n steps of refine-
ment the intermediate good becomes a final good. Each buyer along the chain
can negotiate only with his supplier. This leads to n bargaining problems along
the chain. At each of these steps we assume Nash bargaining with both parties
equally sharing the joint surplus. The value of the surplus is denoted by v > 0.
Intermediate goods are assumed to have zero value when sold outside the produc-
tion chain.
Lets looks at the first production chain in more detail. Consider a supplier
of the original input good, S1, and the buyer B1. We assume that B1 makes a
relationship specific investment i at date 0.9. This investment can be thought
of as the time and money B1 spends in order to find an adequate supplier. At
the time of this investment, the two firms are assumed not to be able to write a
contract which commits S1 to deliver the input good for a particular price in the
future. Thus, B1 must first invest and only then - when the investment costs are
sunk- can bargain over the input price. This leads to a hold up problem in the
bargaining of the price when the input good is actually delivered.
At date 1, the two parties can negotiate about the delivery of S1’s input good
and about the price. v1 denotes the value of the input good to B1. We assume
that B1 cannot pay cash at the time of delivery of the input good because he is
liquidity constraint. Thus, S1 has to deliver the input good on a credit basis, if at
all. B1 will be able to pay when he is paid v1 by the next firm in the production
chain. We assume that enforcing credit repayment to be difficult in transition
economies and thus S1 has to incur some fixed cost x to enforce repayment of
p1. This cost could be thought of as the cost of using the courts and lawyers
fees and potential bribes for judges or other public officials or the cost of private
enforcement like the use of Mafia etc10.
9This section follows Marin and Schnitzer (2003).
10The literature on contract enforcement in Eastern Europe suggests that enforcement with
the help of legal institutions is possible but costly see Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman (1999);
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) get a similar result from their survey among five
transition countries that legal institutions do matter and are used although relational contracting
dominates.
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At date 1.1 after delivery of the input good B1 can try to default on some of
his payment. Let p˜1 denote the price paid by B1 at this date. Figure 2 summarizes
the time sequence of the bargaining at production step 1.
Figure 2: Bargaining at the production step 1
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Let us solve production step 1 recursively. Recall that at date 1, when S1
delivers the input good, B1 has no cash to pay for the input. Thus, once the
input supplier delivers the input, the bargaining power reverses and shifts to B1.
Now the input supplier has to worry of being paid. At date 1.1, after realizing
his profits from selling the input to the next firm, B1 has enough cash to pay but
if he does not do so voluntarily S1 has to incur cost x to enforce payment of p1.
Suppose B1 holds up now the input supplier and refuses to pay the full price p1
on which the two parties agreed at date 1, but offers to pay p˜1 = p1 − x instead.
If this happens, S1 can either accept this payment or enforce p1 at cost x. In
equilibrium he will accept B1’s reduced payment.
At date 1, the two parties have to agree on a price p1. Since B1’s investment i
is already sunk at this date, it is not taken into account in the bargaining over the
input price. Thus, B1 might not invest in finding a supplier relationship because
these costs are not covered by the price. This is what constitutes the hold up
problem of buyer B1. However, the two parties anticipate at date 1 that B1 will
exploit his position after delivery of the input good and pay a reduced price at
date 1.1. Assuming Nash bargaining whenever possible this implies that a price
p1 is chosen such that
v1 − (p1 − x) = p1 − x ↔ p1 =
v1
2
+ x (4.1)
i.e., in anticipation of B1’s future price reduction, S1 marks up p1 in the first
place, if this is possible.
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However, inflating the input price in anticipation of the price reduction at date
1.1 will not always be possible. B1’s liquidity constraint - the cash he gets when
he himself sells the good to the next buyer, i.e. v1 - puts an upper bound on the
maximum payment that can be enforced at cost x. Thus, in order to fully capture
the subsequent price reduction S1 may want to inflate the price by more than can
credibly be enforced as payment at date 1.1, since even at cost x, B1 cannot be
forced to pay more than he has in his pockets at date 1.1. Thus,
p1 = min(
v1
2
+ x; v1) (4.2)
If x is sufficiently large, i.e. x > v1/2, B1’s liquidity constraint becomes binding
which will make it impossible for S1 to pass on these costs to him. B1’s cash from
the sale to the next firm will simply not be enough to fully cover these costs. In
this case, B1 can exploit the fact that he is liquidity constrained to prevent to be
held up by the input supplier. This will, however, only work when enforcement
costs x are just right. When x is low, i.e. x < v1/2, then S1 is able to pass on x in
the price mark-up. In this case, the buyer’s liquidity constraint does not prevent
an equal sharing of the surplus. When x becomes too large, i.e. x > v1, then
B1 captures the entire surplus and S1 cannot guarantee himself a positive payoff.
Thus, in order for the liquidity constraint to alleviate B1’s hold-up problem we
have
v1
2
< i ≤ x < v1 (4.3)
Without a liquidity constraint and enforcement costs, B1’s payoff would be
v1/2, i.e. half the value of production at the first production step, and if i > v1/2
then no production would take place at all, because the surplus does not cover
B1’s investment costs i. However, if enforcement costs are sufficiently high, B1
can exploit this fact to capture more than one half of the production value. Thus,
B1’s ex-post bargaining power has to be sufficiently large to cover his ex-ante
investment, i.e. i ≤ x in order for production to take place. Since S1 needs a
positive profit in order to participate in the deal, enforcement costs may not be
too high either; i.e. x < v1.
We have just seen that S1 may not be willing to deliver the input good if the
credit problem is too severe, i.e. if x > v1. Thus, if the buyer has no cash and
the legal system to enforce payment is poorly developed a potentially valuable
transaction does not take place. Can barter - a trade credit in goods rather than
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cash - help under these circumstances?
Suppose B1 can produce one unit of a barter good, but only after date 1. Let
w denote the value of the barter good and let k denote B1’s production cost.
If B1 sells this barter good to someone outside the production chain he does so
at a cash price pc = (w + k)/2, assuming again Nash bargaining. This would
give B1 a payoff of (w − k)/2. However, B1 can also use this barter good as a
collateral to improve his creditworthiness. In this case, B1 promises to deliver
the barter good to S1 when credit repayment is due. The price for this barter
good, pB, is fixed together with p1 before S1 decides about his input delivery.
The two parties negotiate prices p1 and pB such that they split the surplus of
both transactions equally, taking into account the renegotiation on p1 at date 1.1.
This means that the inclusion of the barter trade allows B1 to shift some profit
back to S1 by discounting the price of the barter good pB. Note, however, that
pB cannot be chosen arbitrarily small because B1 cannot be forced to deliver the
barter good as promised, but has to be induced to do so voluntarily. If B1 cheats
on S1 and refuses to deliver, all S1 can do, given that B1 has signed a contract
that promises delivery of the barter good, is to try to prevent a sale of the barter
good to someone else. We assume that S1 suceeds with such an attempt with
probability (1 − π) which reduces B1’s potential payoff from selling the barter
good to π(w − k)/2, where π < 1. This effectively means that barter creates a
hostage of a given size z, where
z = (1− π)(w − k)
2
(4.4)
Note first, that the size of the hostage z created by barter depends on two
things. First, the value of the hostage increases with the value of the good offered
as a means of payment in barter. This is given by the payoff (w− k)/2 when the
good is sold independently of barter. Second, the value of the hostage declines with
B1’s cheating payoff when he defaults on payment which is expressed by π(w −
k)/2. The difference between these two payoffs is determined by the parameter π
and captures the commitment value which B1 achieves by agreeing to repay the
trade credit in goods rather than cash. By doing so, B1 reduces his chances to sell
the barter good to someone else than S1. (1−π) is the probability of being caught
when B1 cheats on repayment and sells the barter good to someone else than S1.
The parameter π can be thought of as a measure of how well the input seller
can label the barter good as his property. The smaller π, the less ”anonymous”
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the means of payment and the smaller B1’s cheating surplus from defaulting on
payment. Thus, the smaller π, the larger the commitment value of barter and the
larger the hostage z. B1 uses the barter contract as a commitment not to exploit
his bargaining power and to shift some profit back to S1 in order to make him
participate in the deal when his profit from the input transaction is too low due
to large credit enforcement cost x. In this sense, barter creates a deal-specific
collateral that helps to alleviate the hold-up problem when credit enforcement is
prohibitively costly.11
What does the model imply for the pricing behavior in barter transactions?
We need to evaluate how the hold-up problem and the credit problem just de-
scribed will be reflected in the terms of the barter contract. We have just argued
that the hold-up problem in the input deal can be alleviated if the input buyer
faces a credit constraint and barter is used if credit enforcement becomes too
costly for the input seller. Thus, we expect this problems to be reflected in the
prices chosen in non-cash transactions as compared to prices in cash deals where
no such problems are present.
Recall from equation (2) that the price for the input good in barter is
p1 = min(
v1
2
+ x; v1) (4.5)
Compare this price with the cash price for the same input with no such prob-
lems. Without the hold-up problem the price for the input will reflect the fact
that B1 has undertaken an investment, because in this case the investment cost i
can be contracted on before B1’s investment takes place. Furthermore, the input
price will not reflect the credit enforcement cost x, because in this case B1 has
no liquidity constraint and thus there are no enforcement costs x. Splitting the
surplus implies a cash price pc1
pc1 =
(v1 − i)
2
(4.6)
Comparing (5) and (6) shows that within barter the price for the ”sale” side of
the deal will be inflated compared to the cash price for the same input, because
the cash price will take into account B1’s investment cost i (because there is no
11Kranton (1996) suggests that barter as a form of reciprocal exchange can be quite costly by
locking trading partner in.
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hold up problem) and will not include a mark-up for the credit enforcement cost
x (because there is no credit problem).
If p1 cannot be increased anymore because it reaches its upper bound v1, then
we expect the price for the ”goods payment” to be discounted. When the liquidity
constraint is binding and thus S1 cannot inflate the price for the ”sale”, barter
allows B1 to shift some of the profit back to S1 by giving a discount on the ”goods
payment”. Thus, we expect that the hold-up problem and the credit problem both
shift the terms of trade in favor of the input supplier, either by an increase of p1
as compared to pc1 or when this is not possible by a decrease of p
B as compared
to the cash price for the barter good or both.
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4.2. Empirical Evidence
We are now ready to put the model to an empirical test to see whether the
incentive problems just described can indeed explain some of the observed pricing
behavior in non-cash transactions.
For the regression analysis we will use SCASH, PCASH, and TOT as the
indepentent variables. Recall that TOT is defined as the difference of SCASH
and PCASH, where SCASH and PCASH are the percentage differences between
the barter price and the cash price for the input good (the “sale”) and the barter
good (the “goods payment”), respectively. First, we have to find proxies for the
incentive problems described in the previous section. We measure the severety
of the hold up problem on the input good by the complexity index suggested by
Blanchard and Kremer 1997. We construct a deal-specific complexity measure for
the input good SCOMPLEX. SCOMPLEX is an index that takes the value of zero
if the “sale” is produced with one input only and approaches one when the “sale”
good uses several inputs from other sectors. The number of inputs required for
the “sale” good to be produced stands here for the number of bargaining problems
B1 faces. We matched the ISIC sectors of the “sale” good with the sector of the
complexity index given by Blanchard and Kremer 1997. We use as a measure for
the credit problem (a measure for x) the input buyer’s B1 outstanding firm arrears
PARREARS. The idea is that the more B1 is indebted already the less likely it is
that he will repay the trade credit and thus the lower his creditworthyness.
Table 7 shows the regressions explaining SCASH, PCASH, and TOT with
these two incentive problems. The more complex the “sale” good the more severe
is the hold-up problem in the input deal and thus the larger the barter price p1
relative to the cash price pc1. Thus, we expect a positive sign on the complexity
variable SCOMPLEX in the SCASH regressions (given in columns 1 - 5 of the
table).12 We have no prediction for SCOMPLEX in the PCASH regressions (given
in columns 6 - 10 of the table). Because of the positive effect of SCOMPLEX on
SCASH we expect also a positive sign for SCOMPLEX in the TOT regressions
(given in columns 11 - 15). This is supported by the results of the table. The
input specific complexity measure is positive and significant in all the SCASH
12Note that the estimated coefficient on the complexity index can be used to test whether the
hold up problem is on the buyer’s or on the seller’s side. A positive coefficient indicates that
the buyer is held up by the seller rather than the other way around.
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and TOT regressions. Thus, the “real” prices for the “sale” appears to be inflated
because of the presence of a hold-up problem in the input deal.
Turning to the credit problem we expect PARREARS to have a positive effect
on SCASH, since S1 will inflate the barter price for the input p1 relative to the
cash price pc1 to cover the anticipated credit enforcement costs x. Furthermore, we
expect a negative sign for the PARREARS variable in the regressions for PCASH,
since barter is undertaken to shift some of the profit back to the supplier by dis-
counting the price for the barter good. Because of these effects on barter prices
on both sides of the transaction, we expect PARREARS to have a positive effect
on TOT. Turning to the results, we see that PARREARS is insignificant in the
SCASH regressions which suggests that the supplier is not able to pass on the
credit enforcement costs to the buyer. PARREARS turns out to be highly signif-
icant and negative in the PCASH regressions. These results for the PARREARS
variable in the SCASH and PCASH regressions support the story given by the
model of the previous section. Barter is needed to save the deal exactly when the
supplier is unable to pass on the enforcement costs to the buyer and as a result
does not expect to have a positive profit from the transaction. Discounting the
price for the barter good is then a way to make the deal go through by shift-
ing back part of the profit to the supplier. This explains why the prices for the
“goods payment” are predominantly discounted compared to cash prices for the
same goods.
Finally, we include several sectoral dummies (smanuf, pmanuf, sresources, pre-
sources, virtual1 virtual2) to test whether those have any explanatory power for
the pricing behavior in non-cash transactions. None of these variables are signifi-
cant at conventional levels except for the variable SMANUF in the PCASH and
TOT regressions. The positive and significant sign of the estimated coefficient for
SMANUF in the PCASH regressions and its negative and significant effect in the
TOT regressions suggests, however, that the manufacturing sector suffers losses
in the terms of trade by being overpriced on the “goods payment” even when
the sector is a seller in barter transactions. Thus, the manufacturing sector is the
only sector that appears to never gain from non-cash transactions. This is just the
opposite of what the virtual economy argument suggests. Note that this finding
of the regression analysis is somewhat not consistent with the results in Table 4
of section 3 in which the manufacturing sector as a seller gains from barter. A
closer look at Table 4 reveals, however, that the manufacturing sector like textiles,
leather, machinery, vehicles is gaining the least as a seller in barter transactions
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compared to the rest of the economy. For example, the sectors textiles and leather
are gaining 1.6 percent on average as a seller compared to a gain of 6.3 percent
of metal ores and of 4.6 percent when all selling sectors are aggregated (given in
the bottom of Table 4). These averages hide the distribution of the mark-ups on
the “sale” which the regression analysis takes into account. This is the reason
why Table 4 gives a small gain for manufacturing as a selling sector while the
regression analysis indicates a loss from barter for this case.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I explore an influential explanation for the non-cash economy in
Russia, the virtual economy argument, based on deal-specific price data of 165
barter deals in Ukraine. I find that the argument is not consistent with the
actual pricing behavior in barter deals. First, there appears to be no statistically
significant difference in the pricing behavior across sectors. Second, the only sector
which appears to suffer a loss from the non-cash economy is the manufacturing
sector.
I then proceed to offer a model based on the lack of trust and liquidity. The
pricing predictions from this model are then put to an empirical test. It turns out
that real prices on the “sale” side of the barter transaction are inflated, because
they reflect a trust problem and a credit problem between input suppliers and
producing firms. Input suppliers are exploiting the fact that there are only a few
suppliers around and thus switching suppliers is costly and charge higher prices
for their inputs in barter deals compared to cash deals (this is how the trust
problem materializes). If this price mark-up for inputs would happen in cash
deals firms would refuse to buy those expensive inputs and prefer not to produce.
Furthermore, input suppliers have to incur costs of enforcing payment (they have
to involve the Mafia or legal firms) which they want to be covered by the deal.
If these credit enforcement costs become very large (which happens when legal
institutions do not work properly or when firms are already very indebted) then
input suppliers will refuse to deliver the inputs in cash deals because they cannot
expect a positive profit . Thus, in a cash economy the lack of trust and liquidity
prevent many profitable trades from taking place.
In a non-cash economy the deal can go through by choosing the “right” prices
for the “sale” and the “goods payment”, because of two reasons. First, by in-
troducing a second profitable transaction in the form of the ”goods payment”
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the producing firm can buy an inflated input and still make a profit.13 Second,
the input supplying firm gets a discount on the barter good which allows her to
cover the credit enforcement cost. Thus, the non-cash economy helps to maintain
output which otherwise would collapse due to imperfect input and credit mar-
kets. The imperfections of input and credit markets are reflected in a shift in
the terms of trade of barter. Through the inflated price for the ”sale” and the
price discount on the ”goods payment” the deal is actually saved by guarantying
both parties a positive profit. The shift in the terms of trade is the mechanism
by which the non-cash economy accomplishes to maintain ouput which otherwise
would collapse in a cash economy.
5.1. The Time Pattern of Barter
How can this story explain the time pattern of demonetization in Russia given in
Figure 1? In 1992 firms have accumulated substantial debt among each other due
to a refusal of the banking sector to provide credit. Firms turned to other firms for
trade credits when bank credit was not available. Accumulated arrears reached a
critical level in 1995 at which production was unsustainable due to prohibitively
large credit enforcement costs. At this point firms refused to extend further trade
credit (in cash) to each other out of the worry of not being paid. Barter then
stepped in as the only way to maintain production. At this point barter started
to substitute for the non active banking sector as well as for trade credits in cash
which explains the explosive increase. Why then has barter started to decline
with the financial crisis in 1998?
In order to get to an answer it is useful to compare Russia with Ukraine. Both
countries are similar with respect to the time patter of barter (in both countries
barter exploded until 1998 and declined thereafter), but they differ with respect
to the exchange rate and oil ressources. Russia is an oil exporter, Ukraine is an oil
importer. The ruble depreciated by about 50 percent after the August financial
crisis, while the hryvnia showed only a modest decline. The strong devaluation
of the exchange rate and booming world oil markets have both been argued to
13The model actually predicts that in equilibrium the hold up problem is ”solved” and thus
input prices will not be inflated. A look at Table 3 reveals that in 73.6 % of the deals this was
actually the case.
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have contributed to the vanishing barter economy after 1998. 14 However, the
different behavior of the exchange rates and in the importance of oil in these two
countries suggests that some other force must be at work to explain the striking
similarity in the time pattern of barter.
Is the virtual economy argument a candidate explanation? To construct an
argument for the vanishing barter economy along the lines of the virtual economy
hypothesis one has to find a reason why in 1998 the energy producers stopped pro-
viding subsidies to the manufacturing sector. Is is because the energy producers
had less money available? Or because manufacturing firms suddenly started to
create value in 1998? The booming world oil markets and the associated increase
in rents of the energy sector should have made it easier rather than more difficult
for this sector to transfer value to the rest of the economy. Why then has barter
started to decline in 1998? The virtual economy argument does not seem to offer
an answer.
5.2. Out of a Banking Development Trap?
In order to find an answer for the decline in barter we have to turn to the financial
sector. One common feature between Ukraine and Russia that the virtual economy
argument does not touch upon is the financial sector. Russia and Ukraine are
the transition countries with the lowest level of bank intermediation (see Huang,
Marin, Xu 2003). Banks practically did not lend to the real sector and financed
the government budget instead. Huang, Marin, Xu (2003) argue that this was due
to a banking development trap. Banks are not able to distinguish good credit risk
firms from bad ones. They charge interest rates that cover the average credit risk
of all borrowing firms. This, in turn, induces low-credit risk firms to turn to barter
trade to avoid subsidizing the high credit risk firms. The option for low credit risk
firms to raise liquidity through barter trade drives up bank lending rates, since
banks expect higher credit risk firms to remain in the pool of borrowing firms. In
equilibrium, only high credit risk firms borrow from banks while the low credit
risk firms turn to barter. The banking sector looks for high yield government
securities in which to invest. The financial sector is separated from the real sector
of the economy which hinders banking sector development.
14see Ahrend, Aukutsionek, and Parilova (2000) and OECD (2000) who make a similar point.
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With the collapse of of the treasury bills market after the August financial
crisis banks lending behavior changed drastically. They stopped to finance the
government budget and have started to lend to firms. The vanished market for
governement bonds induced the banks to reallocate their assets to the real sector
of the economy. They lowered interest rates to attract borrowers. Lower interest
rates made it attractive for some better risk firms to start borrowing from banks
rather than to continue to barter trade. This improved the creditworthiness of
the pool of borrowers and, in turn, further lowered interest rates and induced
more firms to switch from barter to bank loans. This way, the financial crisis of
1998 helped Russia and Ukraine to get out of a banking development trap which
explains why barter has dropped (see Huang, Marin, Xu (2003)).
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